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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
The cases treat the corporation franchise tax as a privilege
tax or as a condition for doing business as a corporation within
the state, whether the corporation be domestic or foreign. The
tax need have no relation to the property held nor to the business
done nor to the value of the stock or the amount paid for it. Only
some relation to the privilege granted or exercised must be
shown to render the tax constitutional.- And the relation of
the tax to the privilege, required for equal protection, need not
be to the value of the privilege; for the franchise is not assessed
or evaluated as by a business man. As regards classification of
corporations, it is sufficient if legal distinctions 40 are made,
based, for example, upon freedom in fixing the price of the stock
with the attendant ease and facility in its issue and marketing.
The result of these cases seems clear. Taxes on the number
of shares or based on an arbitrary valuation are constitutional
under the equal protection clause, on either authorized or issued
stock of domestic corporations, and on the issued stock of foreign
corporations. Only the authorized stock not yet issued by for-
eign corporations is exempt, partly because of the operation of
the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution. But the con-
stitutionality of the taxes does not imply fairness or expediency
which now become the main questions for the tax making bodies.
The unequal results of a fixed method regardless of actual value
have been pointed out, so arbitrary value or tax on the number
of shares have been disapproved. And the Latrobe case observed
that even taxation on par or the consideration received brought
some serious discrepancies. This leaves us with the possibility
of Mr. Wickersham's second method of those that have been
tried, that of taxing according to a fixed value until the actual
value is shown. The expense of collecting the tax is an element
in determining expediency. Assessing is more expensive than
an arbitrary method, and it is difficult to determine the value of
the property or franchise of a large corporation. This hindrance
is alleviated by causing the overtaxed corporation to present to
the court a schedule of assets before the assessment may be
changed. The practical difficulties have weight, but should not
overweigh the consideration of what is fair and equitable.
ROBERT J. HARDING, '30.
DETERMINING PROFITS OF FIRE INSURANCE COM-
PANIES FOR RATE REGULATION
Administrative control over the rates and premiums of in-
surers is a recent development. The people, having brought the
"Southwestern Oil Co. v. Texas (1909) 217 U. S. 114 at 126.
Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania (1928) 277 U. S. 389; (1929) 27
MIcH. L. REV. 800.
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railroads and other public utilities within bounds, quite natur-
ally turned to the organizations most fraught with public
interest outside of the field of public utilities. The fixing of in-
surance rates is a problem far more difficult than determining
rates for other public services. Progress is necessarily slow;
but there has been a definite advancement since a Kansas statute
authorizing the superintendent of insurance to fix fire insurance
rates was declared constitutional by the United States Supreme
Court in 1914.1
The usual means of control is the insurance commissioner or
superintendent, appointed by the governor and given certain
powers by statute. With regard to the altering and fixing of
fire insurance rates, the commissioner usually has the power of
approval or disapproval of rates proposed by the companies, his
approval being necessary for the schedules to go into effect. An-
other power, and one very popular with the commissioners, is
that of ordering in rates, where they are excessive, a blanket re-
duction. The statutes lay down but few guides to the commis-
sioner in the exercise of this important power. One class of
provisions for his guidance comprises principally such vague
phrases as "discriminates unfairly,"" "increase is justifiable," 3
and "methods employed shall be reasonable." A more effective
type of guide is one providing that the commissioner shall de-
termine the excessiveness of a rate or class of rates by reference
to the profits derived therefrom over a period of years imme-
diately preceding the adjustment5 Provisions of this sort at
least require consideration of the data over a substantial period
of years and prevent reductions because of one or two abnormal
years. But at best these statutes give the commissioner very
meager directions as to the method of determining rates.
rt is fortunate, in view of the meager directions given the com-
missioner, that the statutes usually provide for judicial review
of his decisions. The provisions usually indicate more or less
clearly that the court is authorized to investigate and decide de
novo the questions passed upon by the commissioner. 6 Many of
the legislatures have provided simply for a "review" or "ap-
peal." Such provisions have been interpreted as authorizing a
full judicial review on the merits.
I German Alliance Insurance Co. v. Lewis (1914) 223 U. S. 389 (suit to
enjoin enforcement).
' N. Y. Laws 1922, c. 660, sec. 1; Colo. Laws 1919, c. 138, sec. 9; Pa. Stat.
(1922) sec. 12221; Wis. Stat. (1927) sec. 203.38.
'Ohio Laws 1919, sec. 9592.
IN. Y. Laws 1922, c. 666, sec. 2; Vt. Laws 1919, No. 148; Wis. Stat.
(1927) sec. 203.38.
'N. Y. Laws 1922, c. 660, sec. 2; S. C. Laws 1917, No. 183, sec. 14; S. D.
Laws 1920, c. 66; Wyo. Laws 1921, c. 142, sec. 17; Mo. Laws 1915, p. 313.
"Mo. Laws 1915, p. 313.
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The commissioner, as we have seen, usually has the power to
determine the excessiveness of a rate or class of rates by ref-
erence to the profits derived therefrom. Whether or not rates
are excessive depends upon whether the premium collected over
a considerable period provides not only adequate protection but
also a fair profit to the underwriter. The fixing of reasonable
fire insurance rates involves applying very technical standards
to a mass of data. Statutes never set out the method to be em-
ployed by the commissioner in determining profits with a view
to ascertaining their reasonableness. Yet everything depends
upon the particular method employed. Let us see what the
courts, particularly the Missouri courts, in the exercise of their
power of review over the commissioner's decisions, have said
about the method of determining the profits of fire insurance
companies.
In determining whether or not there has been a "reasonable"
profit, it is necessary first to find out what the profit is. This
naturally represents the difference between income and ex-
penditures. The bases of income and expenditures present the
controverted questions. Before entering on a discussion of the
decisions of the courts regarding the proper method of determin-
ing profits, it is advisable to give a working definition of the
necessary technical terms used in the fire insurance business.
The business is not one dealing in commodities but in service,
indemnity from loss by fire. The service is rendered under con-
tracts by which the insurer assumes the obligation to indemnify.
The consideration for this obligation is a payment by the insured
called a premium. Premium is referred to as "earned" and "un-
earned." As soon as a premium is paid it becomes the absolute
property of the insurer as compensation paid for the contract
of indemnity. It is "earned" in the usual sense of the word. For
that reason the terms "earned" and "unearned" when applied
to premiums are not accurate unless the sense in which they are
used is understood. The terms are used in two connections, with
the cancellation of the policies and also with the protective
reserve.
Policies provide for cancellation by either party during the
life of the policy. As cancellation ends liability before the end
of the term for which the insured has paid, there is provision
for repayment of that portion of the premium paid for the term
remaining after cancellation. The portion of the premium paid
which must be returned is designated "unearned," while pre-
mium for the term before cancellation is "earned."
The reserve has to do with losses under the policies. The in-
surer must always be financially able to pay such losses prompt-
ly. Sound and honest business acumen requires the maintenance
of a liquid fund proportioned to the outstanding risks. To pro-
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tect policyholders by assuring a sufficient reservation, the states
have enacted laws with the idea, usually, of securing such pro-
tection through reinsurance. A fund sufficient to reinsure is
required. As premium rates are the same for all companies-
by law or by business necessity-the premium for the unexpired
terms of the policies is sufficient. This amount is called the "un-
earned" premium. The balance of the premium is "earned." It
is obvious from the foregoing that whether "unearned" premium
be defined as the portion necessary for reinsurance in a solvent
company in case of the insolvency of the insurer, or as the sum
to be repaid to the insured on cancellation of the policy, the
nature and amount are the same.
R. S. Mo. (1919) sec. 6283 authorizes the superintendent of in-
surance to reduce rates of stock fire insurance companies when-
ever the earnings of such companies over a five year period show
"an aggregate profit therein in excess of what is reasonable," so
as to limit "aggregate collections of insurance companies in this
state to not more than a reasonable profit." See. 6284 provides
for a review of such order "by a proper action in the courts"
wherein "the entire matter shall be treated and determined de
novo."
On Oct. 9, 1922, Hyde, then superintendent of insurance, is-
sued an order reducing rates on insurance offered by stock fire
insurance companies ten per cent. One hundred and sixty com-
panies filed a petition in the Circuit Court of Cole County pray-
ing the court to review the findings and order of the commis-
sioner and set it aside.7 The Supreme Court, taking the case on
appeal from a decision canceling the order, was faced with the
problem of determining whether the aggregate profits of the
companies for 1917, 1918, 1919, 1920 and 1921 were in excess of
what is reasonable. The plaintiffs and the defendant, using
practically identical figures, the superintendent being largely de-
pendent in his findings on the data furnished by the companies,
reached diametrically opposite results. According to the plain-
tiffs' calculations the underwriting business in the State of Mis-
souri was operated at a loss over the five year period. The
findings of the superintendent, on the other hand, showed an
enormous profit. The secret lay in what Justice White termed
"the unexplored mysteries of bookkeeping." The plaintiffs con-
tended that income should be based on "earned" premiums, and
that no account should be taken of "unearned" premiums. The
defendant insisted that all paid premiums, "earned" and "un-
earned," should be included in income, together with interest
on investments representing the "unearned" premiums. The
two real points of difference, then, were whether "unearned"
'Aetna Insurance Co. v. Hyde (1926) 315 Mo. 113, 285 S. W. 65.
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premiums should be included in income, and whether the inter-
est on the invested "unearned" premiums should be so included.
The companies argued that the "unearned" premiums were not
theirs and might never become theirs. But the court answered
that while it was true that the fund might, in case of insolvency,
be used for reinsurance, and be lost to the company, the nature
of the business made the fund necessary and meanwhile it was
earning the same income as the other investments.
The methods of determining the profits contended for by the
parties also differed as the basis for calculating losses, whether
it should be losses actually paid during the test period, or the
losses "incurred," the "incurred" losses being the losses as
originally claimed, running from ten per cent to twelve and one
half per cent more than the losses actually paid.
The Missouri Supreme Court upheld the order of the superin-
tendent of insurance in declaring that the reasonable profit per-
mitted the companies under sec. 6283 is properly determined on
the underwriting business done and not the capital invested.
And the proper method to ascertain profit is to deduct losses
paid during that period from the premiums received, including
the interest on "unearned" premiums.
The companies, having lost in the state courts, were anxious
to obtain the opinion of the United States Supreme Court on the
matter. However the Supreme Court dismissed a writ of
certiorari on the ground that no federal question was presented
since the facts brought forward were not sufficient to raise the
question whether the law and the superintendent's order were
repugnant to the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the Constitution.8 This decision forced the companies
to start off on a new tack. They filed suit in a United States dis-
trict court, each company taking the position that sec. 6283, as
construed and as applied to it, in the light of its separate ex-
perience, was unreasonable and confiscatory, and therefore the
order reducing rates was void as to it.9 The court, after con-
cluding as a preliminary matter that the statute was not invalid
simply because it used the aggregate method, but that any com-
pany affected by a reduction order thereunder had a right to
test the validity of the order as applied to it, on the ground that
the effect was confiscatory as to it, and if such contention be
sustained to be released therefrom, went on to uphold the order
of the superintendent in what is perhaps the most lucid opinion
in the books on the subject. It agreed with the Missouri Su-
preme Court that premiums and losses should be taken on the
paid basis. In holding that "unearned" premiums were a part
'Aetna Insurance Co. v. Hyde (1928) 275 U. S. 440.
'Aetna Insurance Co. v. Hyde (1929) 34 F. (2d) 185.
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of income, the judge remarked, "If 'unearned' premiums are to
be excluded from the calculation of income and profits, there is
the anomalous result of an increasingly prosperous business in
fact, and an increasingly unprosperous one in theory." How-
ever, the court disagreed with the Missouri court in regard to
interesA on the investment of the "unearned" premiums, saying,
"Because the premium when paid is the property of the com-
pany, because the interest arises from the investment of such
property, because there is no basis for such result in the fact
that a reserve must be maintained (measured by the premium
required to reinsure), and because it is conceded that the income
from the investment part of the business should not be con-
sidered in a rate making base under the statute, we think there
is no ground for holding that interest from 'unearned' premiums
should be included as income for rate making purposes in these
cases." The court further found that the profits determined in
this manner over the five year period were unreasonable, that
the order of the superintendent reducing rates on certain classes
of insurance ten per cent was justified, and not confiscatory as
to any of the companies.
Thus, seven years of litigation in Missouri have resulted in
victories for the state in every particular except that of interest
on the invested "unearned" premiums, on which point there has
been some disagreement. The courts have agreed that both
premiums and losses should be determined on the paid basis.
There is but one other American case on the subject of the
method of determining profit.-o In that case the Kansas Supreme
Court held that "all premiums should be regarded as receipts,
which, together with other receipts, if any, of the underwriting
business, constitute income for the period under consideration.
From the amount of such income should be deducted actual
losses and expenses, the difference representing gains or prof-
its." There being an equal division, the court made no decision
on the question whether rates should be fixed so as to yield a
fair return upon the amount of capital and surplus, allocated by
some proper method. The court was also equally divided on
whether investment earnings should be considered as a part of
the income, that too being left undecided.
American courts seem to agree that all of the premiums re-
ceived shall enter into the computation of income, while losses
shall be taken on the "paid" rather than the "incurred" basis;
that, although on this point there is some doubt, investment
earnings, even earnings on invested "unearned" premiums, shall
not be considered as income in the rate basis.
" Aetna Insurance Co. v. Travis (1926) 121 Ean. 802, 257 Pac. 337,
aff'd 124 Kan. 350, 259 Pac. 1068.
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The question 'of the method of determining profits of fire in-
surance companies has come up in England in a different con-
nection, being involved in ascertaining proper assessments for
the purposes of the Income Tax Acts. In McGowan's case three
methods were presented to the House of Lords.'] The companies
contended that they were entitled to deduct from the total
premium income, on yearly policies, the estimated or probable
losses on risks unexpired at the end of each year. According to
their figures the losses on such risks would be equal to one-third
in each year of the total premiums. The method employed by
the surveyor of taxes was the familiar one of deducting losses
and expenses paid from gross receipts. A third suggestion made
was that each policy be considered separately. If it had expired,
then the result, profit or loss, should be taken. If it had not ex-
pired, then an estimate should be made, having regard to the
degree of risk during the period unexpired. The House of Lords
adopted the method of the surveyor. Loreburn, L. C., admitted
that the method was not scientifically unassailable since it ob-
viously proceeded on the assumption that unexpired risks at the
beginning and end of a given period are the same, but said, "No
method is scientifically unassailable that does not enter into an
analysis of the contracts made and the contracts current in each
year so minutely that it is in a business sense impracticable."
He went on to explain that if in any particular the rule was
shown to work hardship it should be modified.
In 1912 the question again came before the House of Lords,
and it saw fit to explain and modify its decision in the
McGowan case. 12 It held that the question as to what are the
gains or profits of an insurance company for a given period
is a question of fact, and where there is a controversy
as to which of .two or more methods should be used,
that method should be used that shows the true gains or profits.
The company in that case explained that under its method of
transacting business, paying losses, and keeping books, it car-
ried forward each year forty per cent of the premiums received
during that year as a premium reserve to pay losses on policies
written during that year which might accrue under the terms of
the policies in future years. The government conceded that this
was a fair estimate of the amount necessary to pay such losses,
but called the attention of the court to its decision in the Mc-
Gowan case and the method used there. The court held that
since the method of the company was conceded to be correct on
the facts, it should be allowed, and that the method used in the
McGowan case was not announced as a rule of law, but was
- (1908) A. C. 207.
' Sun Insurance Office v. Clark (1912) A. C. 443.
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adopted in that case because it was the one found to produce the
most accurate results.
The foregoing review of the decisions of the courts regarding
the correct method of determining profits of fire insurance com-
panies shows that, with few exceptions, the method contended
for by the government, as represented by the commissioner in
America and the surveyor of taxes in England, was adopted. It
is interesting to note that in two-thirds of the cases involving
the application of technical standards of any sort the commis-
sioner's decision was sustained by the court.13 This situation is
due probably more to the unreasonableness of the methods pre-
sented by the insurance companies than to any antipathy to-
ward them on the part of the courts. No doubt the courts' inex-
perience in the mazes of the insurance business is a strong factor.
Judges are not qualified for original thought on methods of de-
termining profits. They are forced to adopt what appears to
them to be the most reasonable of the methods presented, and
this is usually the commissioner's method.
There can be no doubt that the courts reached a correct result
in their decisions that "unearned" premiums are a part of in-
come. The commission and other expenses of procuring the
business amount to more than the "earned" premiums on policies
written for three and five years, and consume a large part of
them on policies written for one year. If "earned" premiums
alone are income, the underwriting business is being conducted at
an actual loss, and the more policies written and the greater the
business the greater the loss. Yet at the same time the insurance
companies in Missouri were presenting figures telling this story,
they were paying dividends of twenty-four per cent, and adding
annually to their surpluses. Their explanation of this incon-
sistency, that all of the profits resulted from the investment side
of the business, does not ring true. The safe investments which
are the only kind possible where the invested capital is needed
for protection yield only a two or three per cent return. And
if the underwriting business is such a losing venture, why not
abandon it? The contention of the companies on this point pre-
sents what a Kansas judge termed "a non-sequitur of extra-
ordinary value."' 4
Whether interest on the "unearned" premium is properly con-
sidered in the rate basis is a more difficult question. If it is de-
cided that the investment business is separate and distinct from
the underwriting business, and is not to be considered in the fix-
"Patterson, THE INSURANCE COMMISSION IN THE UNITED STATES (1927)
p. 497.
1 Aetna Insurance Co. v. Travis, n. 10, above.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol15/iss4/7
ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
ing of rates, as the companies have always contended, and as the
Missouri statute indicated, then it is inconsistent to maintain
that investment of "unearned" premium should be considered,
besides being practically impossible to separate it from the pro-
tective reserve fund, which always includes a surplus over the
amount required to reinsure. Missouri has solved this prob-
lem by an amended statute which provides specifically for the
consideration of all investment eaknings. 0
The process of determining what is a reasonable rate in the
case of unstandardized fire rates is best described in the words
of Holmes, as "an intuition of experience which outruns analysis
and sums up many unnamed and tangled impressions . . .1I"
The method of determining profits as a basis for rates adopted
by the American courts probably reaches a fairly accurate result
in the majority of cases. But this does not mean that it is the
only proper method, nor that a more accurate one will not be
found. The proper attitude for our courts to assume is that of
the English House of Lords, that the question of what are the
profits is a question of fact, and that that method should be used
which produces the most accurate results.
PHILIP S. ALEXANDER, '31.
'Mo. Laws 1923, p. 234.
Holmes, J., in C. B. & Q. Ry. Co. v. Babcock (1907) 204 U. S. 585. Pat-
terson, op. cit. 280.
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